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Abstract Global conservation discourses and practices in-
creasingly rely on market-based solutions to fulfill the dual
objective of forest conservation and economic development.
Although varied, these interventions are premised on the
assumption that natural resources are most effectively man-
aged and preserved while benefiting livelihoods if the market-
incentives of a liberalised economy are correctly in place. By
examining three nationally supported payment for ecosystem
service (PES) schemes in Vietnamwe show how insecure land
tenure, high transaction costs and high opportunity costs can
undermine the long-term benefits of PES programmes for
local households and, hence, potentially threaten their liveli-
hood viability. In many cases, the income from PES pro-
grammes does not reach the poor because of political and
economic constraints. Local elite capture of PES benefits
through the monopolization of access to forestland and exist-
ing state forestry management are identified as key problems.
We argue that as PES schemes create a market for ecosystem
services, such markets must be understood not simply as bald
economic exchanges between ‘rational actors’ but rather as
exchanges embedded in particular socio-political and
historical contexts to support the sustainable use of forest
resources and local livelihoods in Vietnam.
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Introduction
Globally, environmental governance schemes are progressing
with urgency to revalue and manage natural resources in
support of specific social and economic goals (Li, 2007;
Dressler and Roth 2011). Based on the market principles of
optimal allocation and use for the common good (Goldman
2001), market-based conservation is often heralded as an
efficient and effective means to improve rural livelihoods
and conserve forests (Pagiola et al. 2005; Wunder 2005;
Kumar and Muradian 2009). By assigning new market values
to ecosystem services and natural resources, such schemes
aim to finance their conservation over time, placing faith in
the market incentives of a liberalised economy (Igoe et al.
2010). By creating a market for ecosystem services, strategies
such as payments for ecosystem services (PES) supposedly
enable local people to generate more income from harvesting
fewer higher value resources than more extensive or destruc-
tive modes of production (Pagiola et al. 2005). Although PES
was originally defined as a voluntary transaction, involving
the conditional purchase of a well-defined environmental
service by a buyer from a seller (Wunder 2005), most now
recognise that such transactions often require states, donors
and civil society to create new markets and associated institu-
tions (Vatn 2010). Depending on how payments articulate
with national, regional and local conditions, the commoditisa-
tion of ecosystem services has implications for the property
rights of the targeted resources, local socio-political relations,
livelihood transitions, cultural dynamics and landscape changes.
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Compared to other conservation interventions, the impacts of
PES on livelihoods can be more pronounced over time due to
the relatively focused income stream going to locals based on
the imputed value of the ecosystem services they should protect.
Usually held as a public good, markets commodify such eco-
system services to supposedly secure their ongoingmaintenance
based on agreed upon criteria that can exclude certain uses and
actors (Lee and Mahanty 2009). PES-based markets thus have
the potential to maintain the monetary value and function of
ecosystem services by upholding regulatory objectives with
productive efficiency, while excluding diverse uses of the same
resource with their associated social welfare benefits
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Mahanty et al. forthcoming).
In this sense, market-based approaches should be under-
stood not simply as bald economic exchanges between
rational actors with perfect market information, but rather as
exchanges embedded in socio-political and cultural contexts
over time and space (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). This
paper explores these processes in the context of PES imple-
mentation in Vietnam.
While Latin America has experimented extensively with
diverse types of ecosystem services, markets for these serv-
ices have lagged behind in Asia and Africa (Scherr et al.
2005). Case studies and examples from Southeast Asia are
only now starting to emerge (see Clements et al. 2010;
Soriaga and Annawi 2010; Thuy et al. 2010) –the first being
the RUPES (Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental
Services) project (Leimona et al. 2008). Empirical evidence
is weak on the practice and impacts of implementing PES in
a centralized governance and rural livelihood context
(McElwee 2012). This paper critically examines the devel-
opment and implementation of three nationally supported
PES schemes in Vietnam’s changing local to national polit-
ical economic context. We examine the prospects for imple-
menting PES projects under a centralised government in
Vietnam, where insecure land tenure, high transaction costs,
high opportunity costs and pervasive capture of benefits by
local elites challenges PES policy and practice. While these
factors often pre-date PES implementation, we find the con-
vergence of PES with local political economies exacerbates
unequal social relations and wealth, undermines the long-term
benefits of PES programmes for rural households, and further
threatens the viability of local livelihoods and conservation
efforts (see McElwee 2012).
After discussing our methods, we review relevant litera-
ture on the institutional structures and livelihood impacts
associated with PES schemes. Next, we describe the devel-
opment of PES schemes in Vietnam at the national level,
and then focus on the differential impact of PES schemes at
the local level in the Ba Vi National Park. We extend this
discussion to evaluate PES schemes currently being piloted
in Lam Dong and Son La provinces. While piloting the
schemes, the government passed a national policy on PES
in the hope of strengthening forest conservation, improving
local livelihoods, and generating revenue outside of the
state budget for nature conservation. This paper will discuss
the challenges for achieving the government’s social, econom-
ic, and environmental objectives for PES, concluding with
potential implications for the scaling-up of PES schemes in
the near future.
Methods
We conducted threemonths of fieldwork in Ba Vi National Park
in 2004–2005 and made various trips in 2009–2010 to Lam
Dong and Son La provinces where the government PES policy
is being piloted. Data were collected through in-depth inter-
views with 50 households, focus group discussions and partic-
ipant observation within communities involved in the PES
schemes. Project documents and government reports were ana-
lysed and project staff and policymakers were interviewed. The
selection of respondents was based on their direct involvement
in PES projects. Since the PES policy is still in its pilot phase in
Lam Dong and Son La, a comprehensive assessment of the
impacts of policy implementation would be premature. Aware
of the limits of our analysis, we concentrate on local perceptions
and implementation of PES schemes on the ground.
Payment for Ecosystem Services: Theory and Practice
The idea of market-based mechanisms for conservation, and
PES in particular, emerged in the 1970s from the belief that the
free market, competitiveness and efficiency underpinning
strong economic development could assign an appropriate
market value to ecosystem services with particular functions
and outcomes (Wunder 2005; Sydee andBeder 2006). In recent
years, sectors of the conservation community have promoted
PES as an effective market-based mechanism to ensure effi-
cient environmental conservation amongst local users (Pagiola
et al. 2005; Wunder 2005). Scherr et al. (2005) emphasize
several trends that have led to the emergence of PES: (i) the
increasing market valuation of ecosystem services as a means
of providing local financial incentives to conservation; (ii) the
search for new sources of conservation finance, particularly as a
response to shortfalls in public funds; (iii) new corporate inter-
ests in environmental investment and corporate ‘social respon-
sibility’; and (iv) supportive changes in resource governance,
particularly institutional changes at the national and local level.
However, as Redford and Adams (2009: 785) state, “PES is
being adopted [at the national and local level] with rapid speed,
and often without much critical discussion, across the spectrum
of conservation policy and debate and developing a life of its
own independent of its promulgators.” For these reasons, the
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task of critically understanding the risks and opportunities
associated with PES is both urgent and significant.
PES schemes are premised on the need to price ecosystem
services that are usually unvalued within markets, involving a
‘voluntary’ transaction where a well-defined environmental
service (ES) (or a land-use likely to secure that service) is
‘bought’ by a ES buyer from a ES provider, if and only if the
ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality) (Wunder
2005: 5). Through PES transactions, non-market values are
supposedly translated into real financial incentives that pay
local actors (i.e., farmers, hunter-gatherers, etc.) who are reli-
ant on natural resources to conserve landscapes and secure
ongoing provisions of ecosystem services (Engel et al. 2008;
Corbera et al. 2007). The adoption of decentralized, ‘devolved’
approaches to implementing PES and related market-based
mechanisms have progressed rapidly, marking a shift in re-
source management policies away from command-and-control
to community-based, market-oriented regulation (Bird and
Rodriguez 1999; Ribot 2004). Market enthusiasts argue that
directly paying resource users creates incentives for them to
manage and protect the natural resources and ecosystem serv-
ices they already rely upon, hoping that they will manage them
sustainably. PES promoters argue that the negative governance
conditions associated with centralized management can be
avoided if market-based mechanisms are institutionalised,
devolved, and adopted by local resource users. As McCarthy
and Prudham (2004) note, this has come to reflect ‘hybrid
neoliberalism’ where the overlap between markets and
devolved conservation centre on faith in the interdependency
and flexibility of markets and civil society, such that both
support the supply and demand of finances, conservation and
local actions. By providing incentives in cash or in kind, PES is
designed to motivate local users to adopt more sustainable land
use practices that secure ecosystem services through, for exam-
ple, direct management and/or improving livelihoods through
alternative uses or intensification (Mayrand and Paquin 2004;
Dudley et al. 2007). Given that PES interventions should gen-
erate economic returns on investment for local users, the as-
sumption holds that the local economic benefits of such market
involvement will outweigh the forgone opportunities of using
natural resources for other purposes, effectively ‘paying’ for
conservation (Redford and Adams 2009; Igoe et al. 2010).
Despite the enthusiasm for PES, some scholars now argue
that market-based approaches are not a panacea for gover-
nance problems and that PES only works under certain com-
plex environmental, socio-political and economic conditions
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Lee and Mahanty 2009;
Muradian et al. 2010). In particular, PES systems require
effectively functioning market mechanisms for ecosystem
services, including the establishment of relationships between
buyers and sellers, the creation of monitoring and regulatory
mechanisms for measuring the services, and maintaining low
transaction costs in pre-existing arenas of political power and
economic disparity (Huang et al. 2009; van Hecken and
Bastiaensen 2010). Crook and Clapp (1998) suggested that
the success of market-based mechanisms for conservation
would depend upon a good scientific understanding of eco-
logical issues, ‘sound’ ecological knowledge by resource
users, ‘strong’ management regulations and enforcement,
and ‘stable’ property rights – all of which exist as a matter
of degree rather than kind in developing countries. As
Mahanty et al. (forthcoming: 3) note “PES schemes seldom
resemble [an] ideal model”, with projects in areas with uncer-
tain markets (Corbera et al. 2007) where buyers and sellers are
in flux (Peskett et al. 2011), and where changing environmen-
tal services are difficult to value (Lansing 2011). While noting
that many conservationists remain sceptical of PES, these
authors warn an uncritical embrace of PES that neglects how
politics, culture and economy govern implementation could
lead to problems for local resource users and conservation
efforts (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002).
The central question, then, is whether PES projects create
more opportunities or risks for the rural poor. PES schemes can
meet both poverty and environmental objectives only when the
poor have unfettered access to forestlands providing ecosystem
services that can be ‘valued’ as capital in practice. This as-
sumption is problematic given the varied socio-cultural ties to
nature and the range of socio-political and economic conditions
that mediate the valuing of nature as a commodity (Dressler
2011). Scherr et al. (2005:535) observe that the poor are able to
benefit from PES only if (a) they can provide the service at a
low cost; (b) they can be contracted to protect forestlands at low
transaction costs; and (c) the land use changes required for the
provision of ecosystem services do not increase their labor
demand or indirectly increase poverty. The potential financial
benefits of PES projects to the poor are limited or non-existent
if they are unable to participate in the schemes due to political
constrains (e.g., corruption, etc.), or if better-off households
capture most of the benefits (Lee and Mahanty 2009). Redford
and Adams (2009) note that as ecosystem services become
increasingly scarce and valuable, people will compete to gain
control over them and the ecosystems they serve, potentially
giving rise to political and economic power struggles.
Implementing PES projects potentially reinforces existing
power structures, inequalities and vulnerabilities (Corbera et
al. 2007) by changing market contexts, and exacerbating
conditions that contribute to local differentiation: the ‘cumu-
lative… process[es] of change in the ways in which different
groups in rural society gain access to the products of their own
or others’ labour, based on their differential control over pro-
duction resources…’ (White 1989: 20). For example, as
wealthier local actors work to improve the status of ecosystems
through PES, they can exert their power to restrict other land
use practices that poorer households invest in as vital subsis-
tence safety-nets (see Dressler and Pulhin 2010). Increases in
value of forests as a result of PES adoption may also trigger
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land speculation, land grabbing and land-based conflicts
(Chhatre and Agrawal 2009). Across rural Southeast Asia, the
trend of common holdings being partitioned and allocated as
forestland contracts (Vietnam) or private title (Cambodia,
Philippines) to wealthier households connected to political
structures is on the rise and, as our case shows, can possibly
be accelerated by PES heightening the market value of land
amongst the poor with ‘insecure’ tenure, further denying them
access rights to forests they depend upon for survival (Sikor
and Thanh 2007; Dressler 2011; McElwee 2012). Finally,
subjecting ecosystem conservation to direct market values
and pricing will invariably lead to stronger commodity rela-
tions and comprehensive, landscape-scale commodification.
So far, there is little evidence that these schemes are meeting
the high expectations advocates place upon them (Porras et al.
2008), but rather a growing concern that PES could diminish
rather than enhance local livelihoods (Cotula and Mayers
2009; Lee and Mahanty 2009).
The Political Economy of PES Implementation
in Vietnam: An Overview
Prior to independence, Vietnam’s forests were managed by the
French colonial state. However, with the absence of the state in
the uplands, in remote areas mostly local communities man-
aged forests (Sowerwine 2004). In 1954 the post-colonial
government nationalised all forests. From the 1950s until the
1980s, forests were managed by a number of State Forest
Enterprises (SFE) directly under the Ministry of Forestry (cur-
rently the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development),
and by local authorities at the district and provincial level
(McElwee 2009).1 Often SFEs’ functions overlapped in that
each was responsible for protecting forests and exploiting
timber to meet logging quotas prescribed by the state.
In practice, however, the SFEs focused on industrial
timber exploitation disregarding their duty to protect forests
(Nguyen Van Dang et al. 2001). As a result, local households
were free to work their land in the forest for agricultural
purposes, as influenced by earlier agrarian policies.2
By 1986, the government shifted from centralised planning
to a market-oriented economy (Beresford 2008:221) – the
process, known as Doi Moi (renovation), leading to less state
control over the forestry sector and smallholder production.
Subsidies previously given to state forest enterprises were
soon cut off, and unproductive SFEs closed down. During
the 1980s, the forest sector was in crisis. There were a number
of conflicts between SFEs and local villagers over forestlands,
as many villagers demanded the return of land that SFEs had
monopolised. In addition, SFEs lacked investment funds to
‘renovate’ (Sikor 1998). By 1990, the country`s forest cover
was 27.8%, a sharp drop from 43% in 1943 (Nguyen 2009).
In response to the crisis, the government restructured the
forestry sector from forest exploitation to forest production
and conservation, with an export ban to reduce the timber
logging volume (McElwee 2009). In line withmarket reforms,
the government undertook decentralization of state forestry,
including passing the 1993 Land Law by which SFEs granted
farmers land use certificates to lease, exchange, inherit, trans-
fer and use land as collateral (Scott, 1999, 460).3 Households
secured forestland title in return for signing forest protection
contracts compelling them to exploit forests in a sustainable
manner, particularly via replanting and protection initiatives
(Sikor and Nguyen 2007). However, while partial control over
the forest (and land) was now being transferred from the state
to individual households, most families acquired titles to
completely barren forestland (Sikor and Nguyen 2007;
McElwee 2009). In some cases, SFEs emerged as powerful
political actors with greater local authority than some state
officials at the commune level, and resented by locals for
curbing access to non-timber forest products and other sub-
sistence resources (Sikor and Nguyen 2007: 2014). This shift
started the process of smallholder ‘privatization’ and, often,
more intensified production (Henin 2002).
The devolution of rights to forestlands under Doi Moi
conflicted with customary tenure and associated access and
use relations in the uplands. In communities with ‘shared’
access to and use of forest resources, the allocation of
forestlands to individual households under title denied
others their right to extract resources for subsistence, under-
mining traditional institutional structures and giving rise to
conflicts (Sikor and Nguyen 2007). In time, the overlap of
formal forestland and informal customary rights gave rise to
access restrictions, unequal social and economic benefits,
and livelihood marginalization (Sikor and Thanh 2007). In
many instances, formal state governance structures, often
associated with the SFE, still defined the monitoring and
management rules of local user groups structured around
forestland allocation (Sikor and Thanh 2007).
Despite significant reforms that stoked economic produc-
tivity in both rural and urban areas (Beresford 2008), land and
forestry reforms were mapped onto, and partly held hostage to,
the existing political economy of forest production. The polit-
ical elite came to control the distribution of forestlands and the
flow of surplus production from forests (Porter 1993).
1 From 1955 to 1960, about 560,000 cubic meters (m3) of timber was
extracted each year. From 1976 to 1980 the annual logging volume was
1.6 million m3 (Nguyen Van Dang et al. 2001)
2 While lands cleared of forest for farming centered on agricultural
collectivization (Kerkvliet 1995:396), after the war in 1975, agricul-
tural policy reforms transferred collective production to households on
individual plots (Scott 1999:460).
3 The land use certificates granted 20-year renewable leases on land for
annual crops and 50 year leases for perennial crops and forestland
(McElwee 2009).
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However, even though political hierarchies and national eco-
nomic dynamics governed the distribution of benefits from
forestland allocation, local peasants’ expressions of discontent
(and resistance) to land allocations as infractions on their right
to subsist were sufficient to allow them to actively engage and
pressure state decisions as to how and to whom forestland titles
were issued, and, ultimately, who became involved in payment
for ecosystem service schemes (Kerkvliet 1995, 2001).
The transition to market-oriented socialism caused con-
siderable deforestation during much of the 1990s, leading to
major state-led reforestation campaigns, including Program
327 (1993–1998) and its successor Program 661 (the Five
Million Hectare Program, 1999–2010), which aimed to re-
plant more than 14.3 millions hectares by 2010 (McElwee
2009). These programs sought to protect large areas of forest
in critical areas (e.g., watersheds) by issuing forestland
contracts to different actors, including a large number of
individual households, who were paid for protecting forests
and planting trees (To 2007). Thus, the state had already
drawn upon market-oriented principles to underwrite efforts
to conserve forestlands and biodiversity before the adoption
of current payment for ecosystem services.
The Vietnam Forestry Development Strategy 2006–2020
further reinforced the emphasis on forest protection for
biodiversity conservation and environmental services in
the context of existing resource uses in and around forest-
lands. Financial incentives were drawn from markets in
order to pay users to conserve, maintain and or protect forest
resources through the allocation of leases (Beresford and
Fraser, 1992). The Strategy optimistically projected that by
2015 the country would derive about US $900 million from
environmental services, and about US$2 billion by 2020. To
facilitate the development of the market for environmental
services, the government established a pilot policy frame-
work for Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES;
Decision 380) in 2008. This was the first national policy to
set out basic definitions for ‘environmental service providers’
and those who benefit from forest-based ecosystem services –
the ‘service users.’ The PES policy focused primarily onwater
supply and regulation, soil conservation, and landscape con-
servation for tourism purposes through local contracts. Two
provinces with different forest ecosystems were selected for
the pilot phase - Lam Dong in the Central Highlands and Son
La in the north. Winrock International and the German
Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ)4 were the
most prominent among the international organizations
that provided financial and technical support. In 2009,
the total revenue derived from service buyers, mostly
hydropower and water supply companies, was 77 billion
Vietnam Dong (VND) (approximately US $4 million) (Hua
2010), 80% of which would supposedly be transferred to local
households providing environmental services.
The results from the pilot projects in Lam Dong and
Son La were used to scale up PES models to 43 forested
provinces. On this basis, the government prepared a pro-
posal for a national decree on PFES to be adopted
country-wide, which was passed in April 2010. PES pro-
ponents believed that this nationwide scaling up could
produce revenues of up to US $1 billion.5 This figure—
together with State media broadcasting the positive results
of the pilot projects—drove high expectations and the
rapid development of PES policy and practice. In 2008,
PES was recognized in the Biodiversity Law, which states
that “organizations and individuals using environmental
services related to biodiversity shall pay charges to service
providers” (Article 74). These changes occurred in the
space of only five years (Huang et al. 2009).
Currently, more than 20 PES projects are being imple-
mented focusing on different kinds of ecosystem services
and carbon sequestration through contracts based on exist-
ing forestland titles in the uplands. Millions of dollars in
funding from both public and private sources have been
committed to facilitate these initiatives for years to come.
The government’s support for the rapid spread of PES is
based on three social, economic and environmental objec-
tives (Nguyen 2009): 1) PES is expected to alleviate rural
poverty by helping communities to protect forests and
improve local livelihoods; 2) PES will establish a sustain-
able source of private funding for forest protection and
rural development to fill current shortfalls in the state
budget; and 3) PES projects are expected to support
forest protection efforts and associated ecological func-
tions. These rapid developments in PES policies have
made Vietnam a ‘successful’ model for other countries
in Southeast Asia, also drawing interest from beyond
the region.6
The first PES program we examine here is the government-
supported incentive payment scheme for forest protection in
Ba Vi National Park, starting in the early 1990s. The second
and third are the more recent pilot schemes Lam Dong and
Son La. A key difference between them is that in Ba Vi the
government is the buyer and payments come from govern-
ment budgets, whereas in Lam Dong and Son La the buyers
4 Winrock International Project, funded by USAID, works mainly to
consolidate and mainstream pilot biodiversity conservation schemes,
Payment for Environmental Services (PES), and livelihoods activities
in Lam Dong Province. The GTZ (currently GIZ) program on man-
agement for natural resources covers three major areas: Sustainable
Forest Management and Policy, Biodiversity and Climate Change and
Coastal Ecosystems Program. One component of the program is to
support the piloting of PES in Son La province.
5 Asia Regional Biodiversity Conservation Program, Winrock Interna-
tional, in a workshop in Bangkok in December 2009.
6 A senior official from the Office of the Government, a key supporter
of PES development in the country, was invited to present Vietnam
PES model in a major meeting on PES in Ghana in October 2009.
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are hydropower plants and water supply companies, with
payments from the profits from the sale of electricity and
water.7
Case Study 1. Payment for Forest Protection
and Planting in Ba Vi National Park
A hill station during the French colonial era, the 12,000 ha Ba
Vi National Park is located in the Hanoi Metropolitan Area
and Hoa Binh Province, one of seven national parks managed
directly byMARD.8 The park borders seven communes in the
buffer zone, among them Ba Vi commune. The park’s prox-
imity to the country’s capital (80 km) has made it a popular
destination for domestic tourists. After independence, the
government declared the “Ba Vi Forbidden Forest” a conser-
vation area – an early form of national park.9 The area thenwas
2,400 ha, comprising all lands above the 400 m contour. In
1991, the government converted the Ba Vi Forbidden Forest
into a National Park and enlarged it to 6,700 ha, encompassing
all land above the 100 m contour. In 2003, the government
further enlarged the park to approximately 12,000 ha.We focus
on the period before the 2003 expansion to examine how the
residents of So village in Ba Vi commune were contracted to
look after the park area bordering their village.
In 1991, the Management Board of the park began con-
tracting out forestland inside its boundaries to different groups
of people, including local households, for forest protection
purposes. “We were ahead of the government policy [Decree
1, issued in 1995],” said a park official in charge of forestland
contracting.10 In effect, land was allocated for a period of
50 years, with restrictions on its use. The contracting of land
in the park peaked in 1996–1997 and it was discontinued in
1999. In total, around 4,200 ha of land between 100 m and
400 m elevation were contracted to 97 land recipients.
Fifty-three recipients were located in the park buffer zone,
receiving 50% of the total land contracted. Decree 1 gave
priority to households in the buffer zone, who were given
direct monetary payments for forest protection in order to
make them less reliant on forests for livelihood. Prior to
2003, annual payments for forest protection were set at
50,000 VND/ha (around US $3). Payment for forest planting
was set at 1.7 million VND/ha (US $113). Since 2003, the
annual payment for forest protection had increased to 100,000
VND/ha (US $5); and the payment for forest planting to 2.3
million VND/ha (US$ 153).
In Ba Vi commune, including So village, a total of 270 ha
of forestland inside the park was contracted to six out of 94
households. These six households were able to access the
program because of their prior knowledge of it as local officials
(chairman of the Commune People’s Committee, secretary of
the Communist Party and chairman of the Veteran’s Group),
effectively excluding the remaining 88 households from the
land contracts.11 The park Management Board issued land use
certificates to the heads of these households, all of whom were
Party officials, allowing them to keep the land for 50 years with
scope for extension if they complied with forest protection
regulations. Land transactions were not allowed under the
Decree without permission from the Management Board and
cutting trees inside the park was only permitted with special
permission from the Prime Minister. In time, the 270 ha be-
came too large for the six households to manage, so they gave
annual leases of traditionally tenured swidden cultivated land
to the other village households in exchange for labour for forest
protection activities. Though they were aware of this practice,
Park officials turned a blind eye in exchange for a share of
forest protection payments from the National Park.
These events were the result of the complex nature of land
tenure in Ba Vi, with different groups holding different sets of
rights granted by different institutions. During colonial times,
villagers’ claims to land were established through their occu-
pation and use of land for swidden cultivation, which they
were permitted to do at lower elevations, usually 100–600 m.
After independence, however, the state nationalized all the
forests, including those in Ba Vi, and put them under the
management of State Forest Enterprises (SFEs) without ever
formally recognizing villagers’ traditional claims to the land.
The newly formed Ba Vi Forbidden Forest was managed by
Ba Vi SFE which had a mandate to manage all the land in the
area except paddy and residential land. In practice though, the
SFE did not restrict local swidden cultivation,12 so that despite
the State’s new claims on the land usurping traditional local
claims, villagers continued to cultivate the land as in the past.
In 1989, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
initiated a eucalyptus plantation program in Ba Vi commune
aimed at increasing both local household income and forest
cover. To establish the secure tenure that was a precondition
for ensuring long-term benefits to households, the FAO
requested the district People’s Committee to formally allocate
7 In fact, these companies are still state-owned, but in the context
of renovation policy, state-owned enterprises have to be financially
self-sufficient.
8 By 2006, Vietnam had 128 protected areas covering about 2.4 million
ha (about 7 per cent of the total natural area of the country); 30 of them
were national parks with a total area of around one million ha (Nguyen
Huy Dung, 2007). Seven of these 30, which have high biological impor-
tance, are managed directly by MARD. The remaining 23 national parks
are managed by Peoples’ Committee of the respective provinces.
9 The term Forbidden Forest implies the restriction in human practices
such as cultivation and hunting inside the forest.
10 Interview in Ba Vi National Park, December 2004
11 “We did not know about the contracting… We only came to know
about it when they [the officials who obtained the land] received money
from the park.” Interviewwith a villager in So village in November 2004.
12 “They [the enterprise] only cared about acacia and resin tree produc-
tion in the area outside the Forbidden Forest and protection of pine trees
in the forbidden area” Interview with the villager in November 2004.
242 Hum Ecol (2012) 40:237–249
each household 1–2 ha of land in the forests. In fact, the land
formally managed by SFE and allocated to the households
were former swidden plots. Households were given land title
for a period of 30 years, with the possibility of extending the
lease on expiry. However, with the enlargement of the forbid-
den forest and establishment of the national park in 1991, the
villagers’ swidden land allocated under the FAO’s tree planting
program now lay within the park boundary. As a result, their
rights to these lands were not recognized by the national park
Management Board. As the Park’s vice manager stated,
“The National Park is established according to the Prime
Minister’s Decision – the highest level of decision mak-
ing power. This decision is much more powerful than the
decision made by the district authority [referring to the
FAO program]. So which one do you see as valid? …
Villagers’ traditional claim? There is nothing to prove
that.…All the land in the country belongs to the state.”13
Nevertheless, villagers continued to cultivate the land as
before. Eventually, however, park officials prevented crop-
ping on Park land, removing the existing crops to make way
for tree planting. Villagers strongly resisted these actions by
cutting down trees and letting their cattle graze freely within
the forest damaging younger trees.
In sum, various actors established contrasting and overlap-
ping claims and rights to land inside the park. This led to
conflicts of various kinds occurring between the Park officials
and villagers (To 2007) as the State disregarded villagers’
claims on the land, as well as unofficial and illegal deals
between the six forestland contract holders and other house-
holds in the village. In addition, collusion between these six
households and the park officials threatened other households’
rights to sustain existing resource use patterns. As a conse-
quence the majority of local households failed to benefit from
the FAO scheme. Local households, particularly newly estab-
lished ones and recent migrants, became less likely to gain
access to land, especially with formal tenure, and consequently
were continually excluded from PES benefits. This situation
created high transaction costs and inequities in benefit distri-
bution from the incentive scheme.
Case Study 2. Recent PES Schemes in Lam Dong
Province
Decision 380 set an environmental service fee for hydropower
plants in Lam Dong province at 20 VND (0.125 cents) per
kilowatt hour of electricity produced; for water supply com-
panies the fee was set at 40 VND (0.25 cents) per cubic meter
(m3) of water supplied.14 The team developed a complicated
equation to calculate the payment levels, but failed to find a
suitable fee to apply to tourist companies benefiting from the
landscape beauty of the forest. The team consulted different
stakeholders, including tour operators, about their willingness
to pay various fee levels and came upwith VND 0.5-2% of the
companies’ gross revenue.15 Recognizing that the forest had
different qualities and ecosystem services, the team calculated
payments according to the type of forest service,16 the status
of the forest (rich, average, poor), and whether the forest was
natural or planted. A K coefficient was developed to reflect
these conditions.17 Decision 380 also stated that 10% of the
total payment derived from environmental service buyers
would be retained to cover the administrative costs of the
government agency managing the payment, with the remain-
ing 90% to be allocated amongst individuals, households or
rural communities – the service providers – receiving forest
protection contracts from the relevant state organizations.
Implementation of Decision 380 in Lam Dong Province
Lam Dong province is located at the source of the Dong Nai
river. Sixty-one per cent of the total area is covered by forest
(Peter et al. 2009), which is of crucial importance to the level
and quality of the Dong Nai river. Almost all forestlands in the
province are managed by 13 state entities, such as manage-
ment boards of protection and special use forests, state forest
enterprises, and private enterprises renting the land for agro-
forestry production and ecotourism. The remaining land is
managed by 564 households, who have been allocated
2,356 ha of forest with land titles in Lam Dong (ibid.).
Decision 380 has been in force since 2008. The key activ-
ities implemented by the provincial authorities on the ground
included (i) measurement of the economic value of ecosystem
13 Interview, Park’s Vice Manager, Ba Vi Commune, May 2004.
14 “We had to consult much literature… but we rely very much on
Russian literature on environmental economics I learned in the past [in
the 1970s] for calculating the payment level… but international organ-
izations also helped us.” Interview with team leader of the Decision
380 drafting team, Hanoi, July 2009
15 “There is no existing literature on how much the company should pay
… so we suggested the figure [VND 0.5-2 per cent of the companies’
gross revenue] to the province [officials] and they said they are ok with it;
we also suggested the figure to some tourist companies and they said they
can afford it.” Interview, a team member, Hanoi, November 2009.
16 The Law on Forest Protection and Development (2004) officially
classifies national forest into three types according to their ecological
function. Protection forest (r ng phòng h ) (accounting for 30% per
cent of the total forest area), is set aside for protection of watersheds,
soil and the environment. Special use forest (r ng đ c d ng) (10% per
cent) is intended for nature conservation, protection of ecosystems and
flora and fauna gene resources, and historical, environmental, and
cultural sites. Production forest (r ng s n xu t) (60% percent) is the
source of wood and forest-based products and is also meant to con-
tribute to ecological protection.
17 The idea of a “K coefficient is to take into account variations in
natural and socio-economic conditions for different types of forests in
the province so that equity and fairness in duties and benefits of the
services sellers can be achieved” (IGES, 2011, 19).
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services, (ii) identification of buyers and sellers, and (iii)
establishment of the organizational and institutional structures
for the distribution of payments (Pham 2009). Around
516,800 ha of forest were identified as potentially providing
ecosystem services (Peter et al. 2009). Water regulation, soil
protection and scenic landscape preservation were determined
as important services of this forest area and were economically
measured according to these functions. Other services such as
carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation, which are
more difficult to measure, were not accounted for during the
piloting phase. A total of 13 ecosystem services buyers were
identified, including two hydropower plants, twowater supply
agencies, and nine ecotourism companies. Payment levels
were set by the government.
In the initial phase, three watershed areas were selected as
pilot sites. These areas provided ecosystem services to four
buyers: two hydropower plants, one water supply organization
and one tourism company. The provincial Peoples’ Committee
requested the buyers to pay the service fee from the beginning
of 2009, generating a total annual revenue of about 47 billion
VND (US $2.8 million) (Peter et al. 2009). Similar to the
previous case, a K coefficient was used to set the different
monetary values associated with the different kinds of forest
services provided. Three levels of annual payments were sug-
gested at 290,000 VND/ha (US $16) per ha for water regula-
tion, 270,000 VND/ha (US $15) for soil protection, and 10,000
VND/per ha (US $0.5) for scenic landscape values. While the
payments for water regulation and soil protection were calcu-
lated based on quality, types, and origin of forest, payments for
scenic landscape beauty were based on the company’s gross
revenue. To ensure that local households were able to benefit
from these revenues, local authorities maintained their own
contract arrangements with local households as in the 327 and
661 Programs. This meant that households without pre-
existing contracts with the state forest enterprises were auto-
matically excluded from the PES benefit stream. In many
villages, the proportion of households with pre-existing con-
tracts was as low as 10%. At the time of writing, US $2.8
million was being paid to 3,400 local households, with each
contracted to look after around 20 ha of forest from the enter-
prises. Counting all forest environmental services provided,
each household will have gained US $600/year, an amount
3.75 times higher than their income prior to PES implementa-
tion (Nguyen Truc Bong Son 2011).
Contracts in Da Nhim commune were signed between the
state enterprise and individual households. However, in order
to reduce transaction costs, the enterprise worked through
groups of households rather than individual households. Fur-
ther, the enterprise signed contracts under Decision 380 only
with households who had already signed the contracts with
them under Program 661, thus excluding all others from
accessing the PES project. Under the PES implementation,
field stations belonging to the enterprise worked with local
authorities at village and commune levels to divide the forests
among groups of about 9–10 households. The forest areas
given to different groups varied in quality, and payments to
household groups also varied. Following guidance from pro-
vincial authorities to mitigate inequality among households, in
some commune villages, officials adjusted payments so that
poor households in a group received higher payments per
hectare than economically better off households.
The adoption of K coefficients posed a significant difficul-
ty for local authorities. As payments were pinned to a house-
hold’s forest area and the status of its forest, changes in the
latter over time made calculating payments a complex task. A
general shortcoming associated with the forestland allocation
process in many upland villages was that the area of land
shown on the land use certificate did not match the actual area
allocated (To 2007). However, lacking the budget to reconcile
the data, the government instead calculated PES payments
according to the land area shown in the land use certificate,
and based on the forest quality at the time of land allocation.
In many areas, the implementation of PES policy is unlike-
ly to solve the problem of poor forest governance. Payment
was made based on participation of the households in the PES
schemes, rather than on performance of the services provided
by the forest. Furthermore, the current structure of forestry and
the way in which PES schemes are implemented ensure pay-
ments do not reach the poor, particularly the poorest– usually
newly-established households and migrants lacking access to
land but strongly reliant on forestland and forest resources.
This compromises the potential of PES schemes to provide
effective forest protection and rural poverty alleviation.
Case Study 3. Son La Pilot PES Scheme
The implementation of Decision 380 in Son La province fol-
lowed a similar process as in Lam Dong. Some 397,000 ha of
the total 500,000 ha of the province’s forests were brought into
the payment scheme, with water regulation and soil protection
being the main ecological services targeted. Three buyers were
identified, including two state-owned hydropower plants and
one water supply company. In contrast with Lam Dong, the
forest area under the payment scheme in Son La was already
allocated to more than 50,000 forest owners in the early 2000s,
mainly local households. The total revenue derived from the
PES in 2009 was 63 billion VND (around US $3.5 million),
with an average payment per hectare of forest of 397,000 VND
(US $21) (Pham 2009).
The distribution of payments in Son La faced a number of
problems. Of the 63 billion VND that should have been
disbursed by payment schemes in 2009, only 9 billion (14%)
was transferred. Only 4,507 households, or less than 10% of
households with forestland, have actually received any pay-
ment, corresponding to a forest area of 50,900 ha. A major
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difficulty facing authorities was the complexity of local land
tenure arrangements. The distribution of payments was based
on existing records of forestland allocation to households in the
early 2000s. However, land allocation was implemented in a
way that was “not accurate, not complete, not scientific, too
fast” (leader of the decree drafting team, who is also the
national coordinator of the pilot policy, interview, Hanoi,
October 2009). Our interviews with officials from the provincial
forestry department revealed similar land allocation issues to
those observed in Lam Dong. The amount disbursed to indi-
vidual households was based on a field-based inventory of
their forest area, quality and type. However, conducting in-
ventories is a time-consuming process, while geographical
difficulties, such as no access to roads, making measurements
and boundary demarcation complex and costly. The drafting
decree team leader estimated that conducting an inventory of
all forest areas in the province would take at least five years at
a cost of 56 billion VND.
Another problem is that there have been many changes in
forest area, forest status, and forest holders in the seven or
eight years since forestland allocation began. Son La Province
has the highest number of hydropower plants in Vietnam -
currently 40, with a further 60 to be built soon. Large areas of
forest in the province, most of which were already allocated to
households, have been cleared for hydropower plants and
many new settlements have been set up for villagers displaced
as a consequence. According to interview data, changes have
also resulted from the construction of two high voltage grids
and a road along the provincial border. In addition, govern-
ment policy has reclassified around four million ha of ‘pro-
tection forest’ to ‘production forest’ that has been converted to
rubber plantations in the Central Highlands. Changes are often
made without consulting local households holding land use
certificates so that they actually no longer manage the land.
These broader changes in land use practices and land tenure
have thus complicated the processes of contracting and pay-
ment making it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve imple-
mentation in the government’s time frame.
Opportunity costs are another constraint to the success of
the PES scheme in Son La. Favorable weather conditions
make the province the second largest corn producing loca-
tion in the country (a total of 117,000 ha, General Statistics
Office 2008). Income derived from each hectare of corn
averages 15 million VND per year (US $800). If these areas
are preserved under a PES scheme, household income would
be less than 400,000 VND (US $22). Given the high poverty
rate in the province (37.9% in 2007, General Statistics Office
2008) and small area of forest that each household received
(an average of two ha), most would likely opt for corn
production, which as a permitted land use, generates more
income than PES.
The delay with the distribution of PES payments in Son La
has put pressure on the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MARD), which will most likely change the
way payments are disbursed in the province. As the country’s
focal point on PES,MARD reported to the PrimeMinister that
forest inventories for areas holding PES potential could be
completed within five years. However, given the current prob-
lems faced in Son La, this time frame is highly unlikely. An
alternative proposed by the Vice Minister of MARD is to
instead rely on local people to accurately report their land
allocations (Vice Minister Hua Duc Nhi, PFES consultation
workshop, Hanoi, February 2010).
Discussion
The Vietnamese state has been central to driving PES and
the market institutions that enable the commoditization and
exchange of environmental services, while also serving as a
major buyer of these services. One objective driving the
government was that implementing PES policy would draw
significant stakeholders into forest protection, improve local
livelihoods, and contribute to poverty alleviation. However,
these objectives have not been fully realised by the PES pilot
policy implemented in Lam Dong and Son La provinces. In
addition to the state, the PES policy in Lam Dong has mobi-
lized a significant funding pool from private actors who use
the environmental services, including hydropower plants,
water supply companies and tourist companies – funds which
were transferred directly to local households. Where house-
holds have large landholdings (on average 20 ha), as is the
case in Lam Dong, they were able to derive a substantial
source of income. The incentives derived from PES schemes
have motivated already locally wealthy landowners to protect
the forest and secure environmental services (Peters et al.
2009; Nguyen Truc Bong Son 2011). However, there have
been major constraints in securing long-term benefits because
the forest owners in Lam Dong are state entities, such as SFEs
and their management boards. The one-year protection con-
tract signed between state entities and local households meant
that household tenure over land was not secure and thus they
had no guarantee of long-term benefits – an example of how
overlapping tenure regimes render access and use rights
ambiguous, confounding PES implementation (cf. Sikor and
Thanh 2007). In Lam Dong we found that in some villages,
SFEs had signed contracts only with households that retained
existing contracts from the 1980s. As a result, only about 10%
of village households gained access to PES benefits, whereas
the remaining 90%, who held unrecognised customary tenure
without a contract were excluded from benefits. This has
triggered conflict in villages, with members of households
excluded from benefits surreptitiously cutting coffee trees
belonging to households with contracts.
Although households in Son La held more secure tenure
rights than those in Lam Dong, they have also not gained any
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significant benefits from PES payment schemes because of
their small landholdings (on average two ha). As payments
were calculated on a per hectare basis, even those households
with secure tenure in the province received only small sums of
money from forest protection services, too small to persuade
them to conserve the forest. Huang et al. (2009) have high-
lighted that for PES to work as a market-based mechanism,
transaction costs must remain low and benefits must support
local livelihoods. This was not the case in Son La, where a
small piece of forestland was allocated to thousands of house-
holds. Furthermore, opportunity costs were high because
households could derive a much higher income from corn
production. This suggests that PES income may compete
with, rather than supplement other livelihood activities.
Engel et al. (2008) observe that state structures in devel-
oping countries often have weak resource governance, high
transaction costs, and information problems and that these
factors could be avoided by adopting devolved market-based
mechanisms. From the Vietnamese Government’s perspec-
tive, the use of PES may have served as a mechanism to
reduce state budget burdens in the forestry sector, rather than
as a mechanism to mobilize additional income to poor rural
households. Following this logic, PES must then generate
sufficient funding for forest protection, and contribute to better
forest governance. However, funding is not the only barrier to
effective forest governance. In Son La, weak resource gover-
nance resulted also from the complexity of land tenure, the
changing status of forest resources over time, the high trans-
action costs in setting up agreements, and the weak capacity of
the state to conduct inventories and track changes to forestland
title. In Son La and Lam Dong, these same factors also
impacted on the effective establishment of PES, with delays
in setting up agreements and disbursing payments. The high
costs of inventory and calculating acceptable payment
amounts weremajor reasons for these delays. The government
responded to these challenges with the development of a
universally applicable ‘formula’ (a K coefficient) and other
criteria. In Lam Dong, for instance, local authorities decided
to pay better-off households a lesser amount per hectare than
poor households as a levelling strategy, although both groups
provided the same kinds and quality of environmental serv-
ices. This suggests that while the PES schemes in Vietnam
partly embrace the ideals of market-oriented solutions, the
socialist market context firmly embeds these programmes
within contrasting political and economic agendas. The cases
presented here show that despite the shift towards the free
market, the state still plays a role in mediating market activ-
ities (McElwee, 2012). In Vietnam, the state is responsible for
institutional design, mediating PES contracts and, often, for
buying environmental services. Despite the fact that the state-
owned enterprises should run their services as financially self-
sufficient, as mandated by the enterprise law, the traditional
state providers – like hydropower plants and water companies
using forest services – still come under strong state protection.
This was reflected when the Hoa Binh hydropower plant did
not pay PES fees of 218 billion VND (US$1.9 million) in
2010, despite numerous payment requests from the MARD.
Eventually, MARD sent an official letter to the PrimeMinister
and newspapers stating the hydropower plant had ‘disre-
garded the Prime Minister’s order [Decision 380]. [and that]
the delay in payment by the plant led to a one year delay of
payment distribution to local households in Son La province’.18
The Hoa Binh hydropower plant was only able to do this
because it is owned and protected by the Vietnam Energy
Group, which belongs to the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
Thus, strong state protection might lead to structural problems
in the case of PES. This is particularly the case since PES
schemes in Vietnam operate with the government as the sole
buyer, who must respond to a range of social, political and
environmental objectives.
The case studies in Lam Dong and Son La have several
implications for the debate on whether PES creates opportuni-
ties or risks for the rural poor. In principle, the payments
derived from PES schemes should be paid to service providers.
In Vietnam, however, more than 60% of forest, particularly
natural forest with many environmental services, continues to
be managed by state entities.19 Payments derived from these
services may provide a strong incentive for state entities to
hold on to the land, capturing the benefit streams associated
with PES while poor households are unable to access such
benefits in the face of stronger restrictions on resource access.
As ecosystem services become increasingly scarce and valu-
able, competition to gain control over the flow of services and
the ecosystems that provide them will only increase – as seen
elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Redford and Adams 2009; Sikor
et al. 2010). During a workshop in Lam Dong City, December
2010, on PES in Lam Dong province, for example, a National
Park director responded to a participant suggesting that some
of park’s 40,000 ha of forest should be managed by local
households as follows: “What is wrong with us [management
board] receiving PES payment?… if we have this money we
will not have to rely on state budget anymore… we will
contract the land to local households if we are unable to protect
the forest.”
18 Dan Viet online newspaper is among several that covered the delay
in PES fee payment by Hoa Binh hydropower plant (see Nha may thuy
dien Hoa Binh chong lenh thu tuong [Hoa Binh hydropower plant
disregard Prime Minister’s order] 14 April 2011, and EVN xin no 218
ti dong [Energy Vietnam asked for the delay in payment of 218 billion
VND] 10 April 2011).
19 State entities include management boards of the protected areas, state
forest companies, and local government at commune level. For further
detail see the statistical data from the Forest Protection Department of
MARD (www.kiemlam.org.vn). The monopoly of state entities over
access to the forest was also hotly debated in the national PES consulta-
tion workshop organized by MARD in Hanoi on 26 February 2010.
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The distribution of payments to households was based on
formal land data records from past land allocation and forest
protection programs. This meant that households established
after land allocation were automatically excluded from pay-
ment schemes. This number is not small, as the land allocation
process commenced in 1995 in many provinces. Clearly, when
PES policy is scaled up nationally, a significant number of poor
will be unable to access PES schemes and benefit from asso-
ciated payments; this suggests that PES schemes operating in
the existing tenure structure which privileges formal over
customary rights to forest, have huge potential to marginalize
poor households. Such outcomes worsen class-based dispar-
ities. In Lam Dong, for example, poorer households not
benefitting from PES schemes have sabotaged the (formally
tenured) coffee plantations of households qualifying for PES
payments.
The PES schemes implemented in Lam Dong and Son La
have similarities to earlier incentive schemes in Ba Vi National
Park. In all three cases, PES payments were not reaching the
poorest households and thus limiting their potential contribu-
tion to rural poverty alleviation. In Ba Vi, all payments were
captured by local elites who had connections to political power
through which they monopolized access to land. The scaling
up of PES in areas like Ba Vi National Park will likely provide
further opportunities for economically better off households,
particularly those with access to political power, to capture the
majority of benefits from PES schemes. The national adoption
of PES will also exacerbate existing inequalities between state
entities and forest-using communities because the former may
continue to monopolize access to forestlands–as was done
decades earlier. The simplification and de-politicization of
complex resource governance structures on which PES
depends may challenge the success of PES, which, in turn,
can trigger tensions and conflicts centered on unequal resource
access and use.
Although the Vietnamese government hoped that the intro-
duction of PES schemes would shift the budget burden for
forest protection from state to non-state actors, evidence from
the three case studies indicates that this is may not occur in
practice. PES-like schemes adopted in Ba Vi were entirely
supported by the government. Although PES schemes in Lam
Dong and Son La have been able to derive about US $60
million per year from private sector fees, there is no clear
evidence that the government’s budget burden will ultimately
be lowered. Instead, the implementation of PES has produced
a new kind of budget burden. In Son La province, PES has
come with new requirements for forest inventory procedures
in the central and provincial government, which are costly and
time-consuming, and for which there is limited budget and
capacity. The share of payments retained by government from
PES schemes was proving insufficient to cover inventory
costs. New sources of funding created through PES have to
be weighed against new budget burdens and the politics of
allocation.,However, no new budget was created for forest
protection in Ba Vi national park and in Lam Dong and Son
La provinces. In addition, since most of the hydropower plants
and water supply companies – the buyers of environmental
services – have been government-owned, they are under the
protection of the state and may delay their payments indefi-
nitely. As a result, the government’s expectation of the nation-
al PES scheme mobilizing new private funding for forest
protection has not yet been met. In any event, the central role
of the state as an environmental service buyer means that the
budgetary burden will be shifted within state agencies rather
than reduced overall, suggesting that PES reflects as much a
state-centred initiative as a market-oriented one.
The Vietnamese government also expected that the adoption
of PES would improve forest protection. While PES policy in
Lam Dong has decreased the number of violations, (Peters et
al. 2009), it is still too early to conclude that a PES program
would be an effective mechanism for forest protection more
broadly in Vietnam. It is unclear whether forest protection in
the pilot site was effective or not prior to the introduction of
PES. Moreover, owing to the lack of technical capacity in
measuring the quality of service provided by the forest, it is
not clear if the quality of service has been improved as the
result of PES implementation. In Lam Dong, most of the forest
area was classified as protection forest and special use forest,
and so had already been under strict state protection. In general,
households have agricultural land outside the forest area man-
aged by the state entities. As a result, pressure on forestland
from cultivation practices has been much lower than in Son La
and Ba Vi, where local households earn their living through
cultivating forestland and it is unlikely that payments for forest
protection will compete favourably with agricultural uses of
that same land, at least at current payment levels.
Conclusion
Vietnam has become known as a pioneering country in South-
east Asia for its use of market-based mechanisms to conserve
natural resources. Within the country, hopes have been high
that the introduction of PES as a market-basedmechanism can
provide a more viable and effective alternative to conventional
command-and-control approaches for resource governance
and sustainable development. The PES policy has been
expected to broaden the benefits from forest protection in
the country, improve the livelihoods of the rural poor, create
sustainable financing for forest protection, and improve the
ecological conditions of forests. However, the apparent PES
‘miracle’ has been hampered by a number of factors, which
apply equally well to other countries in the region. Unstable
land tenure introduced risks for both buyers and sellers
(Wunder et al. 2005; Mahanty et al. forthcoming). The inse-
cure nature of tenure in rural Vietnam has meant that long-
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term benefits from PES schemes have not been guaranteed to
service providers, particularly poor households. Other
countries, such as the Philippines, have struggled similarly
in implementing PES, finding that the provision of secure
tenure –whether private or customary, provided there is stat-
utory recognition–is central to securing local peoples’ com-
mitment to participating in PES schemes (Rosales 2003: 17);
consequently, dramatic changes in forest status and tenure
introduce further complications as market-based schemes un-
fold. Such factors have contributed to high transaction and
opportunity costs, and ultimately challenge the likelihood of
success for PES schemes.
In Vietnam, given the existing forest governance structure
and the way PES payment schemes have so far been imple-
mented, it is unlikely that the scaling up of PES programmes
nationally will deliver the government’s expected outcomes.
On the contrary, we argue that the implementation of PES
could instead further exacerbate pre-existing inequalities as
local elites monopolize direct income flows and state forest
entities control the majority of national forestland. Remark-
ably, even after many changes in PES schemes over time, the
same governance constraints and problems that have long
contributed to inequities in forest access persist, with large
formal forest holdings and payments going to the powerful
few, while the customary land tenure of the poor remains
unrecognized by state authorities so these households are
unable to benefit from PES contracts. Thus far, there has been
no clear evidence that PES will be an effective mechanism for
the state’s priorities of socializing forest protection, improving
the livelihoods of the rural poor, establishing sustainable
sources of funding for the forestry sector, and improving forest
quality.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
References
Beresford, M., and Fraser, L. (1992). Political economy of the environ-
ment in Vietnam. Journal of Contemporary Asia 22(1): 2–19
Beresford, M., (2008). Doi Moi in review: The challenges of building
market socialism in Vietnam. Journal of Contemporary Asia
38(2): 221–243.
Bird, R., and Rodriguez, E. (1999). Decentralization and poverty allevi-
ation: International experience and the case of the Philippines.
Administration and Development 19: 299–319.
Chhatre, A., and Agrawal, A. (2009). Trade-offs and synergies between
carbon storage and livelihood benefits from forest commons. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America 106: 17667–17670.
Clements, T., John, A., Nielsen, K., An, D., Tan, S., Milner-Gulland, E.
(2010). Payments for biodiversity conservation in the context of
weak institutions: Comparison of three programs from Cambodia.
Ecological Economics 69(6): 1283–1291.
Corbera, E, Adger, N., and Brown, K. (2007). The equity and legitimacy
of markets for ecosystem services. Development and Change 38(4):
587–613.
Cotula, L., and Mayers, J. (2009). Tenure in REDD: Start-point or
afterthought? Natural Resource Issues No 15. London: IIED.
Crook, C., and Clapp, A. (1998). Is Market-oriented forest conserva-
tion a contradiction in terms. Environmental Conservation 25(2):
131–145.
Dressler, W. (2011). From first to third nature: The rise of capitalist
conservation on Palawan Island, the Philippines. The Journal of
Peasant Studies 38(3): 533
Dressler, W., and Pulhin, J. (2010). The shifting ground of swidden
agriculture on Palawan Island, the Philippines. Agriculture and
Human Values 27(4): 445–459.
Dressler, W., and Roth, R. (2011). The good, the bad and the contra-
dictory: Neoliberal conservation governance in rural Southeast
Asia. World Development 39(5): 851–862.
Dudley, N., Mansourian, S., Stolton, S., and Suksuwan, S. (2007).
Protected areas and poverty reduction. A research report by
WWF and Equilibrium. World Wide Fund for Nature.
Engel, S., Pagiola, S., and Wunder, S. (2008). Designing payments for
environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the
issues. Ecological Economics 65: 663–74.
Goldman, M. (2001). Constructing an environmental state: Eco-
governmentality and other transnational practices of a ‘Green’
World Bank. Social Problems 48(4): 399–523.
Henin, B. (2002). Agrarian change in Vietnam’s northern upland
region. Journal of Contemporary Asia 32(1): 3–28
Huang, M., Upadhyaya, J., Rohit, and Kerr, J. (2009). Payment for
watershed services in Asia: A review of current initiatives. Journal
of Sustainable Forestry 28: 551–575.
Hua, D. N. (2010). Opening speech in the national workshop on
development decree on payment for forest ecosystem services.
Hanoi February 26, 2010.
Igoe, J., Neves, K., and Brockington, D. (2010). A spectacular ecotour
around the historic bloc: Theorising the convergence of biodiversity
and capitalist expansion. Antipode 42(3): 486–512.
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies. (2011). (IGES). Payment
for environmental services in Vietnam: An analysis of the pilot
project in Lam Dong Province. Forest Conservation Project:
Occasional Paper No. 5.
Kerkvliet, B. (1995). Village-state relations in Vietnam: The effect of
everyday politics on decollectivization. The Journal of Asian
Studies 54(2): 396–418.
Kerkvliet, B. (2001). Introduction: Analysing the State in Vietnam.
Sojourn 16(2): 179–186.
Kumar, P., and Muradian, R. (2009). Payment for ecosystem services.
Oxford University Press.
Landell-Mills, and Porras, I. (2002). Silver bullet or fools’ gold? A
global overview of markets for forest environmental services and
their impacts for the poor. Instruments for sustainable private
sector forestry series, IIED, London.
Leimona, B., Villamor, G., Noordwijk, M. V., Fauzi, A., Utaira, R.
(2008). IFAD grant project tag-534 completion report: Developing
mechanisms to reward the upland poor in Asia for environmental
services that they provide. World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)
Southeast Asia Regional Office, Bogor.
Mayrand, K., and Paquin, M. (2004). Payments for environmental
services: a survey and assessment of current schemes. Montreal:
Unisfera International Centre for the Commission for Environ-
mental Cooperation of North America. Available at: http://www.
cec.org/files/PDF/ECONOMY/PES-Unisfera_en.pdf.
248 Hum Ecol (2012) 40:237–249
McElwee, P. (2012). Payments for environmental services as neoliberal
market-based forest conservation in Vietnam: panacea or problem?
Geoforum.
McElwee, P. (2009). Reforesting “bare hills” in Vietnam: Social and envi-
ronmental consequences of the 5 million hectare reforestation pro-
gram. Ambio: A Journal of the Human Environment 38(6): 325–333.
Lansing, D. (2011). Realizing carbon’s value: Discourse and calculation
in the production of carbon forestry offsets in Costa Rica. Antipode
43(3): 731–753.
Lee, E., and Mahanty, S. (2009). Payments for environmental services
and poverty reduction: risks and opportunities. Bangkok: The
Center for People and Forest.
Li, T. (2007). The will to improve: Governmentality, development, and
the practice of politics. Durham: Duke University Press.
Mahanty, S., Suich, H., and Tacconi, L. (forthcoming). Access and
benefits in payments for environmental services and implications
for REDD plus: Lessons from a global review. Land Use Policy.
McCarthy, J., and Prudham, S. (2004). Neoliberal nature and the nature
of neoliberalism. Geoforum 35: 275–283.
Muradian, R., Corbera, E., Pascual, U., Kosoy, N., and May, P. (2010).
Reconciling theory and practice: An alternative conceptual frame-
work for understanding payments for environmental services. Eco-
logical Economics 69(6): 1202–1208.
Nguyen Van Dang et al. (2001). ‘Vietnam’s economic renovation in
retrospect’, unpublished paper, January 2001.
Nguyen Truc Bong Son. (2011). Kinh nghiem thuc hien chi tra dich vu
moi truong rung tinh Lam Dong [experience in PFES revenue
distribution in Lam Dong province]. Presentation made at the
meeting on Payment Distribution System organized by MARD
in Hanoi, April 28, 2011.
Nguyen, T. P. (2009). The role of the government in developing and
implementing the policy on payment for forest environmental
services in Vietnam. Hanoi: FSSP Newsletter 26–27: 5–6.
Pagiola, S., Arcenas, A., and Platais, G. (2005). Can payments for
environmental services help reduce poverty? An exploration of
the issues and the evidence to date from Latin America. World
Development 33(2): 237–253.
Peskett, L., Schreckenberg, K., and Brown, J. (2011). Institutional
approaches for carbon financing in the forest sector: learning
lessons for REDD + from forest carbon projects in Uganda.
Environmental Science and Policy 14: 216–229.
Peter, J., Nguyen, C. T., and Nguyen, T. B. T. (2009). The pilot
payment for forest environmental services in Lam Dong Province.
Hanoi: FSSP Newsletter 26–27: 11–13
Pham, X. P. (2009). Developing a Decree on Payment for Forest
Ecosystem Services. Presentation at the consultation workshop
organized by MARD in Hanoi. 26 February.
Porras, I., Grieg-Gran, M., and Neves, N. (2008). All that glitters: A
review of payments for watershed services in developing countries,
Natural Resource Issues No. 11. International Institute for Environ-
ment and Development, London, UK.
Porter, G. (1993). Vietnam: The politics of bureaucractic soccialism.
Ithica: Cornell University Press.
Redford, K., and Adams, W. (2009). Payment for ecosystem services and
the challenge of saving nature. Conservation Biology 23(4): 785–787.
Ribot, J. (2004). Enfranchising environment: The politics of choice in
democratic decentralization. World Resources Report, Washington,
D.C.
Rosales, R. (2003). Developing Pro-poor markets for environmental
services in the Philippines. IIED, November 2003.
Scherr, S., Bennett,M., Loughney,M., and Canby, K. (2005). Developing
future ecosystem service payment in china: lessions learned from
international experience. Washington, D.C. Forest Trends.
Scott, S. (1999). Gendered Institutions and Entitlement to Land: An
Analysis of Vulnerability in Vietnamese Decollectivization. In
Hainsworth, G. (ed.), Globalization and the Asian economic crisis:
indigenous responses, coping strategies, and governance reform in
Southeast Asia. Pp. 459–473. Centre for Southeast Asia Research,
Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, Canada.
Sikor, T., and Thanh, T. N. (2007). Exclusive versus inclusive devolu-
tion in forest management: insights from forest land alloca-
tion in Vietnam’s Central Highlands. Land Use Policy 24(4): 644–
653.
Sikor, T., and Nguyen, Q. T. (2007). Why may forest devolution not
benefit the rural poor? Forest entitlements in Vietnam’s Central
Highland. World Development 35(11): 2010–2025.
Sikor, T. (1998). Forest Policy Reform: From State to household
forestry. In Poffenberger, M. (ed.), Stewards of Vietnam’s Upland
Forest. Berkeley, C.A.: Asia Forest Network 18–38.
Sikor, T., Stahl, J., Enters, T., Ribot, J., Singh, N., Sunderlin, W., and
Wollenberg, L. (2010). REDD-plus, forest people’s rights and
nested climate governance. Global Environmental Change 20(3):
423–425.
Soriaga, R., and Annawi, D. (2010). The ‘No-Fire Bonus’ Scheme in
Mountain Province Cordillera Administrative Region, Philippines.
In Tacconi, L., Mahanty, Suich, H. (eds.), Payments for
environmental services, forest conservation and climate change:
livelihoods in the REDD? Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 130–
159.
Sydee, J., and Beder, S. (2006). The right way to go? Earth sanctuaries
and market-based conservation. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 17
(1): 83–98.
Thuy, P. T., Campbell, B. M., Garnett, S., Aslin, H., and Hoang, M. H.
(2010). Importance and impacts of intermediary boundary
organizations in facilitating payment for environmental services in
Vietnam. Environmental Conservation 37(1): 64–72.
To, X. P. (2007). Forest property in the Vietnamese uplands: An
ethnography of forest relations in Three Dao Villages. Berlin
and London: LIT Verlage/Transaction Publishers.
Van Hecken, G., and Bastiaensen, J. (2010). Payments for ecosystem
services in Nicaragua: Do market-based approaches work?
Development and Change 41(3): 421–444.
Vatn, A. (2010). An institutional analysis of payments for environmental
services. Ecological Economics 60: 1245–1252.
White, B. (1989). Problems in the empirical analysis of agrarian
differentiation. In Hart, G. Turton, A., and White, B. (eds.),
Agrarian Transformations. Berkeley: University of California
Press, pp. 15–30.
Wunder, S. (2005). Payments for environmental services: Some nuts
and bolts. CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 42. Center for Interna-
tional Forestry Research: Jakarta.
Wunder, S., Ibarra, E., Bui, D. T. (2005). Payment is good but control is
better: why payments for forest-environmental services in Vietnam
have so far remained incipient. Center for International Forestry
Research: Bogor, Indonesia.
Sowerwine, J. (2004). Territorialisation and the politics of high-
land landscapes in Vietnam: Negotiating property relations in
policy, meaning and practice. Conservation and Society 2:
97–135.
Hum Ecol (2012) 40:237–249 249
